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Admissibility of Voiceprints Not Limited to
"Corroborative Purposes"
United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir. 1975)
O N FEBRUARY 12, 1975, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit decided United States v. Franks,' affirming a district
court ruling, which permitted the use of voiceprints2 for purposes of
identification and marking the first occasion in which a circuit court had
held such evidence admissible.
Defendants Franks and Britton were convicted in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Tennessee of obstructing commerce
in violation of the Hobbs Act,3 and of 18 U.S.C. Section 2 (1970).'
The jury found the pair guilty of procuring others to bomb two Memphis
businesses, namely Jett Hair Care Center and Tri-State Beauty Supply,
whose operations affected interstate commerce. In addition, Franks and
Britton were convicted of aiding and abetting the malicious damaging
of, and the attempt to destroy the establishments by means of an explosive,
1511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir. 1975).
2 Voiceprints are photographic representations of sound waves produced by a device
called a spectograph. The voiceprint technique is based on the theory that no two human
voices are exactly alike, thus resulting in identification by comparing the voiceprint of an
unidentified person with that of an identified one. If the two prints should match, the
unidentified speaker has been determined. Although seemingly akin to fingerprint
identification, voiceprint analysis is often likened to the lie detection technique in that
the reliability depends significantly on the expertise of the examiner. Detractors of
voiceprints dispute the uniqueness of a person's voice, and alternatively question the
effects of the passing of time or impersonation in relation to the spectrogram produced.
Opponents characterize the necessary subjective spectrographic analysis as an increased
chance for error of an already questionable method of identification. See Kamine, Voice-
print Technique: The Structure and Reliability, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 213 (1969); Kersta,
Speaker Recognition and Identification by Voiceprints, 40 CONN. BAR J. 586 (1966).
8 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1970), which reads:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation
of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both.
4 That section reads as follows:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by
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in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 844(a) (1970). A third defendant,
Mitchell, was tried along with Franks and Britton, and found guilty of
knowingly causing blasting caps to be transported in interstate commerce
without a license in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 842(a)(3)(A) (1970).' Prior
to trial, defendants Britton and Mitchell were compelled by court order to sub-
mit voice exemplars which were subsequently compared to recorded telephone
conversations involving the alleged illegal acts. The results of the spectographic
analysis were introduced into evidence during the course of the trial.
The trio combined in asserting 25 claims on appeal, but the appellate
court found no reversible error.' This note is primarily concerned with
the ramifications of two of the claims lodged by Britton and Mitchell:
(1) voiceprint analysis is too inaccurate to be admitted into evidence;'
and, (2) the court order compelling them to give voice exemplars violated
their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure and their
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.'
In support of the first contention, the appellants relied on the sole
federal circuit decision speaking to the admissibility of voiceprints, United
States v. Addison,"° which held voiceprints inadmissible. The Addison
opinion was itself based on Frye v. United States," long recognized as
the leading case in determining what scientific evidence should be admissible.
The Frye standard maintains:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized and expert testimony deduced from well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs."
5 That section reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by
means of an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property
used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or
foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years or fined not
more than $10,000, or both....
6 "It shall be unlawful for any person ... other than a licensee or permittee knowingly
... to transport, ship, cause to be transported, or receive in interstate or foreign
commerce any explosive materials...
7511 F.2d at 28.
8 Id. at 33.
9 id. at 32.
10 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974), afl'g, 337 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1972) (involving the
spectographic identification of defendant Raymond as the maker of a telephone call to
which a police officer was responding when shot).
"' 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
12 Id. at 1014.
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This test reflects an understanding that scientific proof may assume a mystic
infallibility in the eyes of a jury and tries to assure that a minimal reserve of
experts exists to actually exercise a "scientific determination." Thus, the
Frye approach limits the factfinding process by excluding scientific evidence
of only marginal reliability," seeking to eliminate those tests which might be
deemed accurate by the trier of fact solely because the particular expert
on the witness stand so testifies.
The Addison court, taking note of the substantial number of experts
critical of voiceprint reliability, found the scientific community too much in
conflict to sustain spectogram comparison.1" The Franks opinion acknowledged
the variance of federal and scientific opinion relating to the use of voiceprints,
but opted to base its decision on the considerable area of discretion which a
trial judge enjoys in admitting or refusing evidence based on scientific
processes. 5 In particular the court noted United States v. Stifel: " "[N]either
newness nor lack of absolute certainty in a test suffices to render it
inadmissible in court. Every useful new development must have its first
day in court. And court records are full of the conflicting opinions of
doctors, engineers, and accountants....""
The Franks court admitted that the Stifel decision applied the Frye
standard, but deemed "general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs" as being nearly synonymous with reliability.1" To buttress the
reliability concession, the court pointed out the trend in other jurisdictions
to admit voiceprint evidence'" and the fact that neither defendant, although
airing their criticism of the technique via cross-examination, produced a
witness rebutting the government's claim of accuracy.2"
It would appear that the Franks court could well have rested its decision
on the aspect of the trial judge's discretion, amplified by a stipulation that it
was up to the trier of fact to decide what, if any, weight was to be given to the
expert testimony. 1 By interjecting "reliability" as synonymous with "general
acceptance," the court left the door open to the many detractors who insist that
voiceprint analysis is far from a generally accepted technique in any discipline,
let alone the acoustical field." Moreover, the court retreated even further with
13 C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203 n. 32 (2d. ed. 1972).
14 498 F.2d at 745.
"1511 F.2d at 32.
16 433 F.2d 431 (6thCir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971) (permitting the
admission of neutron activation analysis to identify the source of certain package
fragments remaining after an explosion).
17 Id. at 437. is 511 F.2d at 34.
19 Id. at33. 2 0 1d.2 1 E.g., Jaster v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944).
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the intimation that had Britton and Mitchell produced experts opposed to
voiceprint analysis, the court might have found voiceprints to be unreliable.
Having done little in the way of clarifying the reliability problem, and
having retreated from what started out to be a marked departure from the
Frye standard and its outgrowths,23 the Franks decision does add a significant
element which expands upon the admissibility of voiceprint evidence as
expounded in prior case law.
Of the few appellate courts passing on voiceprint admissibility, several
have expressly limited their decisions to the corroborative aspect of voiceprint
identification. In 1971, the Minnesota supreme court in State ex. rel. Trimble
v. Hedman,24 sanctioned voiceprint identification evidence to the extent of
satisfying the sufficiency of proof necessary to establish probable cause and
to corroborate aural voice comparisons.2 5 The Trimble decision was followed
by the Florida appellate decision in Worley v. State,20 in which evidence was
already ample to sustain the conviction, the court specifically holding that it
was proper to admit voiceprints to corroborate defendant identification by
other means 2 and reserving judgment as to whether spectograms were limited
to corroboration.28 The most recent federal decision dealing with spectographic
analysis, prior to Franks, was the Pennsylvania district court case of
United States v. Sample.29 The court permitted voiceprints to be introduced
into evidence, but left little doubt that such admissibility was only for
the purpose of corroborating the state's testimony in a proceeding for the
revocation of probation.
The very first appellate court to approve voiceprint identification, and
perhaps the most favorable decision toward admissibility prior to Franks was
the military case of United States v. Wright.30 The case involved obscene phone
calls, and focused on strong identity testimony from witnesses who had heard
the obscene conversations. Noting the tape recordings which were entered as
evidence, the court stated that it was for the trier of fact to determine for
23 Of the numerous courts which have relied on the Frye standard, few have shed light
on what "general acceptance" connotes other than to employ "general" in an everyday
context of "extensive but not universal." See United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685
(D.D.C. 1972). A slight twist to the Frye test was introduced by People v. Williams, 169
Cal. App. 2d 858, 860-61, 331 P.2d 251 (1958), which held in admitting the results
of a nalline blood test that general acceptance should be measured by those who
would be expected to be familiar with its use.
24 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971).
2' Id. at 457, 192 N.W.2d at 441.
2 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. App. 1972).
271 d. at 614.
28 ld. at 614-15.
29 378 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
'n 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967).
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himself the margin of expert error in connection with the voiceprints." With
the emphasis placed on the strong identity testimony and existing taped
conversations, the opinion implies that voiceprints were to be used only for
corroborative purposes. Soon after the Worley decision came Alea v. State,: a
case in which once again the evidence was already ample for conviction and
in which two witnesses had already made positive identification with the aid
of spectograms 3 The Alea court frequently referred to the Worley rationale,
thus limiting voiceprints for corroboration purposes only.
A pair of 1973 decisions, the California appellate opinion of Hodo
v. Superior Court," and the District of Columbia Superior Court judgment
of United States v. Brown," found spectograms admissible in criminal cases,
but dealt primarily with the test to be applied in determining reliability rather
than the situations in which it would be held admissible.
Other courts have not been disposed to admit voiceprint evidence for any
purpose. In 1967 and 1968 respectively, the New Jersey supreme court in
State v. Cary 6 and a California appellate court in People v. King" rejected
voiceprints as lacking in the requisite reliability. Following these decisions
the trend toward acceptability pressed ever forward, but an obstacle fell
suddenly in the road with the 1973 opinion of People v. Chapter,38 which
flatly rejected the reliability of voiceprints for any purpose.
The Franks court, unlike the bulk of other courts which have admitted
spectographic analysis, does not limit the voiceprint to corroborative purposes,
at least not expressly. Obviously the voiceprint evidence was used in
conjunction with the testimony of the government informants, but the Franks
opinion fails to tie the knot between them. This fact, coupled with the court's
emphasis on the Stifel test, brings the Franks decision at least arguably closer
than any prior opinion to breaking the bond of using voiceprints merely for
the corroboration of other evidence.
Appellants' second contention, that the court order compelling them to
31 Id. at 191, 37 C.M.R. at 453.
32265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. App. 1971).
331 d. at 98.
3' 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973).
" 13 Crim. L. Rep. 2203 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973).
36 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967), on remand, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (Law
Div. 1968), remanded again, 53 N.J. 256, 250 A.2d 15 (1969), aft'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264
A.2d 209 (1970) (the opinion viewing the reliability of voiceprints as a collateral
question which would divert attention from the important issues).
37 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968) (the court observed that a high stand-
ard for admissibility would protect the integrity of the factfinding process).
38 13 Crim. L. Rep. 2479 (Cal. Super Ct. Matin Cty. 1973) (the decision calling for
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give voice exemplars violated their constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure and their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination,
was summarily dismissed by the Franks court's reliance upon United States
v. Dionisio.3 The Dionisio case dealt with both issues in a voice exemplar
situation, but realistically was a compilation of previous decisions rendered by
the Court and discussed below. In an attempt to define the scope of the self-
incrimination privilege, the Dionisio Court noted Schmerber v. California:"0
Both federal and state courts have usually held that [the privilege] offers
no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photo-
graphing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear
in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular
gesture. The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different
ways, is that the privilege is a bar against compelling "communications"
or "testimony" but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused
the source of "real or physical evidence" does not violate it.'"
This rule was followed by the court in United States v. Wade,12 where a
defendant, accused of bank robbery, was compelled to utter in a lineup the
words allegedly spoken by the robber. The Wade Court stated that the accused
was "required to use his voice as an identifying physical characteristic, not
to speak his guilt." 3 Since a voiceprint identification is but a form of real
evidence, requiring a person to produce a voice exemplar would not seem to
constitute self-incrimination.
As the Court pointed out in Schmerber, the obtaining of physical evidence
from a person produces a potential fourth amendment violation at two
junctures, namely the seizure of the person to bring him into contact with
the authorities and the subsequent search." Had Britton and Mitchell been
illegally detained the subsequently compelled voice exemplars may well have
constituted a violation, but such an illegal detention was simply not in evidence.
In the case of voice exemplars, the second time interval brings into play
the facets of the self-incrimination argument and an accompanying right to
privacy. However, in Katz v. United States,'5 the Supreme Court seriously
limited the right of privacy in this context by stating that the fourth
amendment provided no protection for what "a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his home or office. .,,,."6 Applying Katz, the Dionisio
39 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (involving compelled voice exemplars for the grand jury of transcripts
taken directly from tape recordings of conversations relating to interstate gambling).
40 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
41 ld. at 764.
42 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
43 Id. at 222-23.
44 384 U.S. 767 (1966).
4, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
'" 389 U.S. at 351.
RECENT CASES
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decision alluded to the fact that a person's voice, in opposition to the content
of a specific conversation, is repeatedly produced in public for others to
hear and that a person had no more reasonable expectation that others
would not know the sound of it than he could reasonably expect that
others would not know his face. 7
What then is to come of the Franks decision? The answer might well be
forthcoming from the United States Supreme Court, which has noted probable
jurisdiction.48 Standing alone, the Franks opinion can in no way be interpreted
as settling any and all of the constitutional questions relating to voiceprints. If
voiceprints continue to be admitted into evidence it is only logical that more
questions will be raised concerning constitutional rights. Complaints of
violations of fourth and fifth amendment rights will no longer be a mere
addenda to the question of admissibility, but will rather form the crux of the
argument before the court and conceivably force alterations in the present
judicial outlook. It might be contended that the nature of voiceprint technique
entitles a person to have counsel present at the taking of a voice exemplar.
Even if such is not the case, the voiceprint might be taken prejudicially, this
subject to exclusion on due process grounds. Such prejudice could arise in a
number of ways, for instance: (1) the examiner might be aware of other
evidence thus affecting the outcome of his analysis; (2) the examiner could be
biased initially, or, (3) the accused might be forced to submit several voice
exemplars, thus affording a better opportunity for producing a match.
Undeniably the Franks decision is significant in that it is the highest
federal ruling to admit voiceprint evidence. The real significance, however,
may revolve around the initial broad test that the court evinced concerning
the admissibility of evidence and its omission of the words "corroborative
purposes." It remains highly unlikely that any court in the near future
will adopt the liberal view of the Franks outlook on admissibility, which
at least inferentially bears resemblance to the test applied by State v. Cerciello
49
in admitting fingerprint evidence for the first time in New Jersey:
The law in its effort to enforce justice by demonstrating a fact in issue,
will allow evidence of those scientific processes which are the work
of educated and skillful men in their various departments and apply
them to the demonstration of fact, leaving the weight and effect to be
given to the effort and its results entirely to the consideration of the jury."0
R. BRENT CHAPMAN
47 410 U.S. at 14.
48 419 U.S. 828 (1975).
4986 N.J.L. 309, 90 A. 1112 (Ct. Err. & App. 1914).
5
0 Id. at 314, 90 A. at 1114.
[Vol. 9:1
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